When the Attachment Is Just a Link: Phishing via Cloud Sharing

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A message with no attachment and no suspicious link: "Anna has shared a document with you." The sender is the cloud service itself, the design is right, the button leads to the provider's address. Every check passes — not because the checks were circumvented, but because there is nothing to object to.

Why these messages are genuine

There are two builds, and the more interesting one is the less conspicuous.

The imitation copies the provider's look and links to a foreign domain. It is the older variant and can be spotted by the familiar means: look at the sender address, look at the link destination.

The genuine one is a different matter. Here somebody creates an account with a large provider — free, in two minutes — uploads a file and shares it with your address. The notification that then arrives really does come from the provider. It is authenticated, it comes from their network, it links to their domain.

A filter can do little about that. Blocking the provider's domain would mean blocking legitimate use along with it, and that is an everyday occurrence in every organisation.

1 · sharing notification 2 · the provider's page 3 · the document 4 · sign-in page sender: the genuine cloud service domain: the provider's own content: one single link domain: foreign — this is where it happens Three stations withstand any check. The fourth is never checked.
The attack does not sit in the message but two steps behind it — in a file no mail filter ever gets to see.

What is in the file

The shared file usually contains very little: a logo, a line of text, a button. "This document is protected. Sign in to view." Or a blurred preview of an invoice with the same prompt over it.

The point is that the link sits in the file, not in the message. That moves it behind every check: a filter judging links in email sees the sharing notification. It does not see the PDF opened three clicks later.

It is the same principle as with QR codes in messages: put the address where nobody reads it.

The most awkward variant

Up to here the sender is a stranger. The harder case is the one where they are not.

When a business partner's account is taken over, the share comes from a person you work with regularly, from an account you know, often referencing an ongoing matter. There is not a single marker in the message that is wrong.

No inspection of the message helps against that — only a rule about the process: a share that belongs to no agreed piece of work gets queried, by phone, on a number you already have. It is the same rule that applies to changed bank details, and for the same reason.

What can still be spotted

  • A document that demands a sign-in is not a document. Access is settled when the file is shared, not in its content. If you were able to open the file, access has already been granted — a second sign-in inside the file makes no technical sense.
  • The sign-in page belongs to the provider or to nobody. Anyone asked for credentials at a cloud document should read the address bar. If it says anything other than the domain whose account is being requested, the matter is settled.
  • The sharer is named in the notification. An unknown name, or an address at a free mail provider, does not fit a business matter.
  • The file itself is usually empty. A genuine shared document contains content. A page with a button on it contains none.

What organisations can do

The most effective lever is not detection but what lies behind it — the question of what an intercepted password is still worth:

  • Sign-in methods bound to the domain. A security key or a passkey checks which site is asking before it answers. On a rebuilt sign-in page it hands over nothing. It is the only second factor that reliably holds here.
  • Mark or restrict external shares. Most cloud administration consoles can flag notifications from outside the organisation or limit them to known partners.
  • Have sign-ins from unexpected contexts checked further. Access from an unfamiliar network to an account otherwise only used from the office is grounds for a query.

The markers of a fraudulent message remain valid alongside this and are summarised elsewhere. They simply no longer apply to the message in this particular case — they apply again to what the message asks for.